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Abstract. !is paper investigates the strategies of global companies operating in power generation 
and supply, electrical equipment, and oil and gas industries in Russia. Russian energy sector has been 
considered by these companies as a huge and perspective and Russia has shown in the last two decades 
the greatest activity in the "eld of internationalization of major national industries through IJVs. Local 
joint ventures are therefore one of the cornerstones of these "rms strategy in the respective energy sec-
tors of Russia’s economy. !ese partnerships facilitate the entry process to Russia, raise an e#ciency of 
post-entry operations, and prevent the state intervention in Russian operations of western companies.
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Introduction
!is paper stresses that international joint venture (IJV) provides a multinational en-
terprise (MNE) with the most of advantages available in the core industrial markets of 
Russia. Our study is aimed at understanding the role of IJVs in the internationalization 
strategy of MNEs in Russia’s energy industry, and to reveal the prospects of IJV for 
MNEs in the respective sectors of Russian economy.
!e phenomenon of IJVs of western MNEs and local "rms in emerging economies 
was widely discussed in the last decade (Lane, Salk & Lyles, 2001). Joint venture ( JV) 
versus full ownership is one of the most important considerations by MNEs when the 
entry strategy came to a decision (Panibratov, 2009).
!e results of the IJV strategy are positive in most cases; however, the discrepan-
cy exists regarding the factors that are likely to ensure the success of such IJVs. One 
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viewpoint is that IJV e#ciency derives from the MNEs’ contribution of highly valu-
able "rm-speci"c advantages to the IJVs in the less developed economy, such as sophis-
ticated technology, manufacturing skills, and managerial expertise (Luo, 2005). !e 
main concerns of that approach are raised about the potential loss of these intangible 
assets transferred from MNEs to local partners. Another point of view is that the most 
signi"cant factor of IJV success is the ability of MNEs to dodge legal restrictions and 
gain access to cheap resources via forming an IJV and using other operation modes on 
downstream markets.
While previous debates on an entry mode are rooted in di$erent conceptual em-
phases on the bene"ts of control versus the bene"ts of collaboration, our study began 
with the realization that performance di$erences among IJVs are more likely to depend 
on the multiple functional capabilities of the "rm, which in turn partly arise from the 
control-collaboration dichotomy. 
We examine four case studies from the energy sector of Russian economy to ana-
lyze the process by which MNE enters the market and explores its strategic capabilities. 
We suggest that the most prominent MNEs ensure their advantages via bene"ts of IJV 
based entry to Russian oil and gas, and electricity markets.
Our approach suggests how MNEs can develop their strategy for the emerging mar-
ket using the bene"ts of IJV. Speci"cally, we consider environmental factors such as for-
eign direct investment (FDI) legislation and local market competition, each of which 
has been considered to exert an important impact on the success of IJVs (Kostova & 
Zaheer, 1999; Luo, 2007). !e research uses a case study approach. 
!e paper structure follows its objectives. Firstly, the theoretical background of IJV 
strategy is analyzed. Next, the case study methodology is explained and proved for this 
study. !e main part consists of four MNEs’ case studies in Russian energy sector. In 
the end of the article we conclude by discussing how our theoretical approach and sup-
portive "ndings can advance new research on the perspectives of IJV as of MNEs’ strat-
egy for Russian market.
2. Conceptual framework
2.1. Why companies choose IJV strategy and how it works
Considerable research has already been done in joint venturing when entering and op-
erating new international markets. Generally, MNEs considering entry into a new over-
sea market by manufacturing face two strategic decisions regarding the organizational 
form of its foreign operation. First, they have to determine the investment mode, name-
ly, green"eld (establishing facility from scratch) vs. brown"eld (developing an already 
existing asset), and, secondly, the level of control over its investment (full ownership vs. 
IJV) (Ruiz-Moreno, Mas-Ruiz & Nicolau-Gonzálbez, 2007).
Usually, a joint venture is de"ned as a legal organization that takes the form of a 
short- term partnership in which the parties jointly undertake a transaction for mutual 
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pro"t. Generally, each party contributes assets and shares risks. Like a partnership, joint 
ventures can involve any type of business transaction and the parties involved can be 
individuals, groups of individuals, companies, or corporations.
Many companies choose to form an IJV in order to enter foreign markets, which 
would not be available due to the lack of knowledge, capital and technology (Hall, 
1984). !ere are several motives for an establishment of an IJV. !e main goal of the 
IJV can either be the setup of a new business, the strengthening of an existing business, 
the restructuring of an existing business or the development of new core capabilities.
!e main advantages for forming IJVs include economies of scale and synergy, ac-
cess to a greater pool of resources, elimination of a competitor or foreign market entry. 
Further reasons within a foreign market might be that the "rm gained enough expe-
rience in the country and sees itself ready for acquiring equity ownership in another 
company. Possibly, the company chooses a JV strategy to gain more knowledge and 
experience in the foreign market before it acquires full equity and operates as a wholly-
owned subsidiary. Joint ventures might also be chosen as entry mode when smaller 
companies need to "nance their research and development projects (Kumar, 2010). 
!ere are, however, a number of risks related to IJVs that can result in loss of control, 
lower pro"ts, con/ict with partners, and transferability of key assets. 
Joint ventures fall into several categories (Table 1). Among them are equity based op-
erations that bene"t foreign and/or local private interests, groups of interests, or members 
of the general public. !ere are also non-equity joint ventures, also known as cooperative 
agreements, in which the parties seek technical service arrangements, franchise and brand 
use agreements, management contracts or rental agreements, or one-time contracts, e.g., 
for construction projects. Quite o=en, non-equity joint ventures are used simply to pro-
vide access for the participants into foreign markets (Hennart, 1988).
TABLE 1. Equity- and non-equity based IJVs
Equity based IJV Non-equity based IJV
Common 
features
Bene"ts
Economies of scale and synergy
Elimination of a competitor
Drawbacks
Need to share pro"ts
Con/icts with partners
Distinct 
features
Gaining more knowledge and 
experience
Yes (IJV is o=en a 
preparatory stage of 
acquiring full equity)
Less access to partners’ 
knowledge and 
experience
Chance for smaller companies 
to "nance their R&D projects
Yes In a lesser degree
Access to a greater pool of 
resources
Yes In a lesser degree
Transferability of key assets High Key assets are protected
Risk of losing control Yes No
Based on: the overview of the literature referred to in Section 2
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!e traditional view is that IJVs as well as acquisitions are predominantly used by in-
vestors with weak competitive advantages, while investors with strong advantages "nd 
green"eld investment more e#cient (Kogut, 1988). At the same time, IJV mode may 
help when the MNE faces the risky environment. Kogut and Singh (1988) argue that 
with greater cultural distance green"eld investment or IJV are more likely than acquisi-
tion.
Local market competition is another important environmental factor that de"nes 
the bene"t of IJVs in comparison with other entry forms. When local market competi-
tion is weak, exploitation of existing knowledge of foreign parent "rms may be su#cient 
for gaining competitive advantages in the local market. When the level of competition 
heightens, IJVs have to be more responsive to the needs of local consumers, suppliers, 
and governments in order to seize more market opportunities and alleviate competi-
tive threats. Such a high level of local responsiveness requires IJVs to revitalize existing 
capabilities or build new capabilities speci"cally for the local markets such as brand, 
distribution, and innovation (Birkinshaw, 1997; Luo, 2005).
2.2. Why MNEs use an IJV as strategic alternative to FDI in developing economies
Buckley and Casson (1998) conclude that market structure as well as competition 
intensity in the market has crucial impact on the entry decision. !e theory of entry 
mode choice provides important insights into the determinants of this decision (Mül-
ler, 2007; Cheng, 2006; Bjorvatn, 2004). 
Many authors try to give an explanation for choosing entry strategies into countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe. Müller (2007) suggests that these countries are charac-
terized by speci"c conditions for competition that di$er from other markets. He shows 
that green"eld investment is the optimal entry mode, if the local competitor possesses 
an inferior technology, which is o=en the case in CEE, and in fast-growing markets with 
low competition intensity. !ese "ndings correspond with recent empirical evidence 
on outward FDI of the US multinationals. Nocke and Yeaple (2007) report that com-
panies engaging in green"eld investment are systematically more e#cient than those 
engaging in cross-border acquisitions.
Previous research showed that FDI legislation varies across industries even in the 
same host country (Beamish, 1993; Zaheer & Zaheer, 1997). Gaining a "rm legal 
station is considered as particularly important for MNE in the context of developing 
economies due to frequent government interference and strong environmental volatil-
ity (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Zhou & Li, 2008). In governmentally encouraged industries 
(e.g., infrastructure and telecom), where international investments and technologies 
are highly needed, foreign "rms face relatively favorable or stable policies (Luo, 2005); 
in sectors where government has a strong tendency to protect local companies (e.g., oil 
and gas), however, MNEs face an unfavorable regulatory environment.
When considering the IJV results, a focus can be made on three related but distinct 
factors needed for IJV success: limiting partner-related risks, enhancing partner com-
mitment, and ensuring the e$ective use of knowledge in the IJV (Li, Zhou, & Zajac, 
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2009). !e "rst two objectives point us to the control vs. collaboration dichotomy. To 
overcome this, in emerging economies, particularly in Russia, MNEs o=en combine 
FDI with IJV, where joint venture is the "rst stage of the development of own plant 
(Panibratov, 2010). Speaking further on the success of IJV we will have in mind both 
entry via JV and consequent switch to another mode (e.g., full ownership), and devel-
opment of operations on the basis of JV (e.g., the replication of JV strategy in the new 
oversea location).
Di$erent entry modes represent varying levels of control, commitment and risk. 
Each mode of entry entails a certain level of resource commitment, thus it becomes 
very signi"cant decision especially while entering emerging economies, because it is 
di#cult to change from one entry mode to another without considerable loss of time 
and money.
Entry mode choice is driven by the need to minimize transaction costs, which in 
turn arise from the costs of "nding trading partners, and the costs of negotiating, writ-
ing and enforcing contracts. Where these costs are high, "rms will prefer high control 
solutions to safeguard their investment, and thus locations that a?ract investments with 
high transaction costs are more likely to observe entry via a wholly-owned subsidiary. 
High control entry modes are more likely to be chosen when entrant "rms possess ca-
pabilities that are strongly embedded.
In industries with weak FDI legislation, collaboration bene"ts become relatively 
more important for IJV than control bene"ts, because IJVs are in greater need of the 
mutual commitment of partners and their knowledge combination for enhanced le-
gitimacy (Li, Zhou, & Zajac, 2009). !e mutual commitment of partners will contrib-
ute to the IJV in terms of: advanced intangible assets of foreign partners that the local 
economy lacks; local partners’ knowledge about the formal rules and informal con-
straints; and both formal and informal connections with local government and other 
institutions. An e$ective combination of the foreign and local knowledge will show 
the government and the local business communities how IJVs can bring in advanced 
knowledge to bene"t the local economy, which, in turn, improves social perception of 
IJVs and enhances the relationships between IJVs and the local environment (Chan & 
Makino, 2007).
As MNEs usually provide the IJVs with a variety of performance-enhancing resourc-
es and capabilities, such as sophisticated technology, managerial and marketing exper-
tise, or global support (these resources and capabilities are typically most scarce, pro-
prietary, and inimitable in developing countries (Yan & Gray, 1994)), Parkhe (1996) 
suggests that IJV motivation must be viewed in line with its location because it may 
vary in developed countries and developing economies. Local companies in emerging 
markets o=en lack these assets and skills, and local authorities o=en require MNEs in-
terested in entering these markets to establish IJVs for the purposes of absorbing "rm 
speci"c advantages of MNEs (Beamish, 1993; Meyer, 2004). 
!e IJV needs to combine advanced technology and products of the foreign part-
ner with local knowledge and resources of the local partner (e.g., understanding of lo-
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cal consumer needs and government requirements, and connections with local sup-
ply chains and the government). E$ective mechanisms are thereby needed to motivate 
and facilitate the combination of both partners’ knowledge and resources (Lane et al., 
2001). All above considerations lead to the conclusion that in some cases the factor 
calls for control or collaboration, but sometimes the factor may refer equally to both 
(which is re/ected in Table 2).
TABLE 2.  Control-collaboration perspective for the selection of IJV based entry mode
Priority for control Priority for collaboration
Internal factors
Cultural distance from  
the target country
Weak competitive advantage 
of one party
Possession of valuable but imitable technology
External factors
Volatile environment 
in the target country
Legal restrictions
Strong local market competition
Based on: the overview of the literature referred to in Section 2
Summarizing what was said, existing research gives enough theoretical insights to 
entry mode choice trying to resolve the dilemma of control and collaboration. !e pre-
vious research on the internationalization through IJV uses the perspective of the in-
dustrial enterprise and business environment. Still, we believe the behaviour of compa-
nies facing the typical developing market issues should be investigated further. Russian 
energy sector is of particular interest in this case because of legal restrictions in some 
industries prohibiting foreign investors from gaining more than 50% share in local com-
panies. !is allows us to compare the behaviour of companies “forced to joint venture” 
with those who chose the IJV strategy by themselves and their methods of resolving 
control vs. collaboration dilemma.
3. Research methodology
!e main goal of the article is to study the strategies of western MNEs in Russian energy 
sector by investigating these "rms’ activities and operations in respective industries. Of 
our particular interest are the choice of entry and operation modes and the preferences 
of these MNEs in terms of control-collaboration dichotomy. !e perspective of IJV is 
considered as highly explanatory for this set of tasks.
3.1. Reasons for case study method adoption
!e success of MNEs when entering emerging markets is di#cult to evaluate in quanti-
tative terms, unless studied in the context of a systematic questionnaire survey of man-
agers. Even then respondents may be reluctant to disclose political strategies such as 
a?empts at bribery (we discovered it when we tried to reveal the success factors of Rus-
sian subsidiaries of MNEs outside current research).
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However, this research is not aimed at analyzing merely managerial perceptions but 
rather at determining the motives and reasons for selection of IJV as a strategy for Rus-
sian energy sector. We were also interested in possible political in/uences as well as in 
the impact of competitors when approaching the study. !is endeavor would be very 
di#cult, if not impossible, using statistical analysis. Case study methodology lends it-
self be?er to investigating the signi"cance of non-economical events and processes.
A further reason for adopting a case study approach is that the issue of the interna-
tionalization of the core sectors of emerging economies and the role of the IJVs in this 
phenomenon still requires a more careful conceptualization and theory building. As Ei-
senhardt (1989) argued, the case study approach is especially appropriate in new topic 
areas. For the above reasons, we adopted in our research a case study methodology.
Given our general interest in how MNE success can be a?ained in emerging econo-
my environment, we aimed to study the process of MNEs’ obtaining the market leader-
ship via IJV in Russia. When developing the methodology for our study we adopted 
recommendations of Halinen and Törnroos (2005) and Doherty (2009) who discuss 
the opportunities and challenges of a qualitative/case study approach adoption to ex-
amine the international partnerships based strategies.
As our research focused on the process of entry in the form of IJV, we speci"ed that 
our selected case studies had to be major "rms which are said to have obtained a leader-
ship in major Russian industries over local "rms and other foreign players.
3.2. Sample speci!cation
Since any case study research faces the problem of generalization, our research design 
a?empted to ensure relatively broad geographic focus within one country, which is 
Russia. We sought four case studies of about the same time-span.
Our case studies – Royal Dutch Shell, British Petroleum, ABB, and Siemens – "t our 
initial sample speci"cations, coming from two major energy markets in Russia (oil and 
gas, and electrical power generation and supply), and all four "rms are recognized  as 
having obtained success in entering the respective markets in Russia.
Shell and BP had been Russia’s largest foreign investors since the start of huge pro-
jects in the oil and gas sector a=er the fall of the Soviet regime. ABB and Siemens are 
two highly recognizable MNEs with the constantly strong market share in Russia.
Despite representing just one sector this sampling hopefully allows us greater gen-
eralizability of results due to the large scale of these four MNEs operations in Russia. 
Hence our "ndings cannot be accused of being related to some anomalies in non-mar-
ket behavior but rather deal head-on with the process by which MNEs entered impor-
tant marketplaces in emerging economies. 
3.3. Data sources and collection
Our study combines multiple data collection methods. We wanted to examine how the 
four MNEs bene"ted from IJV strategy in Russia. As most of the events took place a 
long time ago, it is very hard to trace actors who were involved. !erefore, the most 
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important data source for this research was published material, supplemented with the 
interviews with experts in the energy sector as well as in the related industries in Rus-
sia. Senior managers of companies (foreign and Russian) being a#liated with the major 
players of Russian energy sector were interviewed.
We utilized "ve public sources of data to derive the cases analysis. !e "rst source 
was the RusEnergy agency which specializes in monitoring of tendencies in oil and gas 
industry of Russia. Being an independent privately-owned "rm established in 2000 by a 
group of Russian experts with a long experience in consulting and publishing business, 
RusEnergy may be considered as reliable source of information. We identi"ed the fol-
lowing information from the RusEnergy about the oil & gas sector and case companies: 
the recent development trends of the industry and case companies’ activities in Russia.
!e second source was Russian Oil & Gas Sector Report which was conducted in 
2007 by Rai$eisen Bank, RZB Group. Being focused on the analysis of three Russian 
companies – Gazprom, Lukoil and Rosne= – this source helped to reveal and under-
stand networking perspectives of the case companies. 
!e third source was Datamonitor’s Energy & Utilities section, which represents 
the most comprehensive database on the companies in the energy sector and contains 
detailed information about companies’ operational activities. !is outlet gave us the 
opportunity to track and analyze the energy market dynamics and their impact on the 
case companies operations.
!e fourth source was Van Dijk Bureau’s Zephyr database containing most of major 
deals between companies around the world. It allowed us to track most important in-
vestments of the case companies within two last decades.
!e "=h source was the own public data of case companies. !e background and ap-
pearance of companies are presented through the most general "gures and information 
from annual reports and websites of all four case companies.
!e research relied heavily on the work conducted within several study projects at 
St. Petersburg State University, Russia. !e data received during the VE\ study of 
industrial companies in "ve major regions of Russia in 1998-2000 by Helsinki Metro-
politan Development Corporation (Helsinki, Finland) was also used. 
3.4. Case study protocol
!e recent events discussed in the cases relied heavily on interviews with the company 
managers and industries’ experts. We conducted nineteen in-depth semi-structured in-
terviews with managers of those foreign and Russian companies involved in the joint 
projects or networks with case companies. !e interviewees were all senior managers, 
who were personally involved in taking key strategic decisions over the expansion or 
collaboration of case companies in Russia and had intimate knowledge of the speci"cs 
of the progress of IJV strategies. 
Having de"ned the objectives of our research and the theory investigated, we started 
seeking an access to the "eld data and to the sources available (the la?er are speci"ed in 
the section above). 
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When developing a case study protocol we decided to shape our questions around 
the following issues: the evaluation of the IJV role in the company position globally; the 
reasons for using an IJV when entering Russia; the e$ects of an IJV on company posi-
tion in the retrospective; the frequency of the use of an IJV based strategy compared 
with other entry modes and post-entry strategies; the importance of the control vs col-
laboration when moving to Russia if compared with other countries; the e$ects IJV 
brings about in a Russian company in comparison with other economies.
!e "nal questionnaire consisted of 35 open questions. In our interviews we asked 
respondents: why Russia was chosen for entry; what arguments were selected to follow 
the particular strategy; what motivated the company management in developing the 
particular form of operations in Russia; how important was to enter in partnerships in 
the time of entry and what was the a?itude towards partnerships later on; what were 
alternatives to IJV strategy, whether these opportunities were explored, and how; what 
were the most di#cult decisions towards IJV strategy (in terms of switch, stretch or 
exit); how the political environment in/uenced the strategy for Russia in general and 
the IJV strategy in particular.
Because of the diverse sources of information and data, we have constantly cross-
checked information and data from di$erent sources to increase the reliability and ac-
curacy of our explanations.
4. Case studies of MNE in Russian energy industries 
!e interesting and illustrative examples of IJV strategies for Russia have been dem-
onstrated by MNEs in various industries. Many companies have selected IJV as the 
cornerstone of their Russian strategy. In this paper the IJV strategies of four MNEs 
in two energy industries (oil and gas, and power supply and electrical equipment) are 
analyzed.
!e time frame for this study is 1990-2010, but the most important deals and events 
of case companies vary within this period of time.
4.1. Oil and gas sector 
Oil companies are looking to internationalize their operations either to hedge risk or 
to respond to market factors. Many international oil companies are diversifying their 
assets and operations by acquiring production assets to balance their exploration assets.
In 2009 the oil and gas manufacturers as well as the whole industry confronted with 
a problem of low oil prices, which had recently occurred and strongly a$ected the busi-
ness activities in this sector. Between 2005 and 2008 oil prices were steadily increasing 
to the highest levels ever seen (RusEnergy, 2008). A=er this rapid growth, which con-
sistently led to higher revenues and pro"ts, market prices for pertrochemical produc-
tion collapsed implicating the beginning of the recession.
Foreign deals may be the only way for some energy-rich countries to extract value 
from their natural resources. !ese players can succeed globally but must focus on spe-
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ci"c kinds of ventures: mainly those that stimulate demand for their products or secure 
market access for their reserves (Rai$eisen, 2007).
One the one hand, in order to ensure sustainable balance between the supply and 
demand for the petrochemical production as well as stable pricing system, there is a 
high necessity for a bigger amount of capital investments in the oil and gas industry. On 
the other hand, price deviations caused by speculations on "nancial derivative markets 
make the in/ux of investments unstable. 
4.1.1. Case study 1. Royal Dutch Shell
Royal Dutch Shell (Shell) is engaged in oil and gas exploration and processing, trans-
portation and marketing of natural gas and electricity, and marketing and shipping of 
oil products and chemicals. !e company also shows interest in renewable sources of 
energy such as wind, solar and hydrogen power.
In 2009 the company, being headquartered in the Hague, the Netherlands, had ex-
tensive operations in more than 90 countries around the world and employed more 
than 100,000 people. !e company recorded revenues of $278,188 million in the "-
nancial year 2009, a 39.3% decrease from 2008 "gures. !e income of the company was 
$12,718 million in 2009, 52% less than in 2008 (Shell annual report, 2010).
One of the biggest IJV projects of Shell was announced in 2008 together with 
Chinese state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and Qatar Pe-
troleum International (QPI). !is IJV would build an oil re"nery and petrochemical 
products manufacturing complex in China. !e integrated re"nery and petrochemical 
complex with state of the art production capabilities would produce re"ned fuels and 
petrochemical products. Shell would hold a 24.5% interest in the IJV, PetroChina 51%, 
and QPI 24.5% (Datamonitor, 2008).
!e re"ning capacity in China was forecasted to increase from 6.2 million barrels per 
day (b/d) in 2006 to 14.6 million b/d in 2030, with about 60% percent of the world’s 
petrochemical demand growth occurring in Asia, and more than one-third in China 
alone (Datamonitor, 2008).
Shell was active in other IJVs. !e Athabasca Oil Sands Project (AOSP), a joint ven-
ture (Shell 60%) with a capacity of 155,000 b/d of synthetic crude, and with potential 
to achieve production licenses of 770,000 b/d, consisted of the Muskeg River Mine and 
the Scotford Upgrader, located in Alberta, Canada. 
Shell operated with a 50% share in another large scale project of a /oating produc-
tion, storage and o^oading vessel (FPSO) with the capacity to produce up to 100,000 
barrels of oil and 50 million cubic feet of natural gas a day – Parque das Conchas. Two 
more partners were Petroleo Brasileiro (Petrobras) holding 35% and India’s ONGC 
Campos with 15%.
Over the years Shell had occasionally sought to diversify away from core oil, gas and 
chemicals businesses. !ese diversi"cations have included nuclear power (a short-lived 
and costly joint venture with Gulf Oil in the USA); coal (Shell Coal was for a time a signif-
icant player in mining and marketing); metals (Shell acquired the Dutch metals-mining 
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company Billiton in 1970) and electricity generation (a joint venture with Bechtel called 
Intergen). None of these ventures were seen as successful and all have been divested.
!e company made a series of acquisitions in 2000s to increase its size and expand 
its operations across di$erent regions. Shell’s expansion strategy was focused on high-
potential sectors. !e company sold a number of facilities in France, Austria, and Aus-
tralia, and expanded joint operations in Port Arthur (Texas, USA) and the Pluto LNG 
"elds in Australia. 
In 2009 Shell agreed to form an IJV with ExxonMobil and Chevron to erect a lique-
"ed natural gas facility on Barrow Island o$ the coast of Australia. Chevron will own 
50% of the facility while Shell and Exxon will each have 25%. !e special a?ention of 
Shell to China is illustrated by the rise of more than 30 IJVs and wholly owned a#liates 
with accumulated investments of $4 billion (Datamonitor, 2009).
Projects of Shell in Russia included: the development of deposits on the Sakhalin 
shelf in the Sakhalin II project together with Gazprom, Mitsui and Mitsubishi; the de-
velopment of Salym oil "elds, together with Sibir Energy; and participation in the Cas-
pian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) (RusEnergy, 2009). 
Sakhalin Energy was set up in 1994 to implement the project, in which Gazprom 
had a 50% stake plus one share. Partners Royal Dutch Shell, Mitsui & Co. Ltd., and Mit-
subishi Corporation hold stakes of 27.5% minus one share, 12.5% and 10% respectively 
(RusEnergy, 2009).
Sakhalin II is one of the world’s largest integrated, export-oriented oil and gas pro-
jects and Russia’s "rst o$shore gas project. When running at full capacity, expected in 
2010-2011, Sakhalin II may add 5% to the world’s current lique"ed natural gas (LNG) 
capacity. It will meet almost 8% of Japan’s gas needs and 5% of South Korea’s demand.
Another IJV of Shell, SPD (Salym Petroleum Development) was established on a 
50:50 basis by Shell Salym Development B.V. and NK Evikhon controlled by Sibir En-
ergy in 1996. SPD held licenses for all three Salym oil "elds in Western Siberia.
Shell was also interested in other Russian markets, namely crude oil and petroleum 
products’ trade; gas stations; aviation fuel supply; lubricants (Table 3). In 2001, the IJV 
of Shell Overseas Investments BV and Russian Aerofuels Group with shares of 70% and 
30% respectively was registered in Moscow. In 2006 Shell AZS (Shell-owned Russian gas 
station network) acquired 4 gas stations from Barrel Ltd (Van Dijk Bureau database).
TABLE 3. Notable Royal Dutch Shell deals in Russia
Buyer Target Industry Stake Year
Royal Dutch Shell Sakhalin Energy ( JV) Oil/gas extraction 27.5%-1 1994
Shell Salym Development Salym Petroleum 
Development ( JV)
Oil extraction 50% 1996
Shell Overseas Investment JV with Aerofuels Group Aviation fuel supply 70% 2001
Shell AZS 4 gas stations owned by 
Barrel Ltd.
Gas retail sale 100% 2006
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!is data shows that the "rst stage of Shell’s operation on Russian market was aimed 
at securing resource access to raw resources by forming JVs with local and foreign com-
panies. !e fact that has drawn our a?ention to Shell’s activities is their intention to 
operate independently or at least as a major stakeholder in downstream markets despite 
all the factors generally a?ributed to emerging markets: corruption, weak legislation, 
government dependency, etc. Although not allowing to build theoretical assumptions 
by itself, this evidence at least shows the preference of control over collaboration in 
downstream markets.
4.1.2. Case study 2. British Petroleum
British Petroleum (BP) is one of the world’s largest energy companies, providing its 
customers with fuel for transportation, energy for heat and light, retail services and 
petrochemicals products for everyday items. Sales and other operating revenues of the 
company were $239,272 million in 2009 with pro"t equalling $13,955 million. In 2009 
the company employed around 92,000 people in more than 30 countries (BP annual 
report, 2010). 
Among BP businesses, TNK-BP was the largest not only within other Russian oper-
ations of the company but also on the worldwide scale, involving about 70,000 people. 
TNK-BP was formed in 2003 from the assets of TNK (Tymen Oil Co.), Onako, Sid-
anco, and BP. !e company was 50% owned by BP and 50% by a group of large Russian 
investors: Alfa Group, Access Industries and Renova. 
TNK-BP operated in nearly all of Russia’s major hydrocarbon regions, including 
West Siberia (Tyumen, Khanty-Mansiysk, Yamal-Nenetsk and Novosibirsk Regions), 
Volga-Urals (Orenburg and Saratov Regions, and the Republic of Udmurtia), and East 
Siberia (Irkutsk Region). In 2009, the group’s oil and condensate production totaled 
almost 72 million tons. !e gas sales from the group’s own resources totaled 12.1 billion 
cubic meters (TNK-BP annual report, 2010).
TNK-BP had "ve re"neries in Russia and Ukraine and marketed its products 
through 1,600 retail service stations operating primarily under the TNK and BP brands. 
!rough its retail network, TNK-BP was among the market leaders in petroleum prod-
uct sales in European Russia, including Moscow, and was the market leader in Ukraine. 
In 2008, TNK-BP held 197 licenses. In 2007, it acquired 25 licenses, including 13 
new exploration licenses for both mature and new, undeveloped areas. During the same 
period, 13 licenses were divested.
In 2007, the group exported 41.8 million tons of crude oil. A signi"cant portion of 
this was transported in Transne=’s pipeline system, and 12% was exported by rail. In 
addition, the group exported 15 million tons of re"ned products. TNK-BP owned and 
operated "ve re"neries (four in Russia and one in Ukraine) with a total e$ective capac-
ity of 23 million tons per year. In 2007, these re"neries processed 22.4 million tons 
(RusEnergy, 2007).
In Russia, the group was selling gasoline and about 35% of diesel through its re-
gional marketing subsidiaries using their retail networks. In 2008, the group’s retail net-
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work included around 1,100 retail sites. Of these, 496 were owned and operated by the 
group’s marketing subsidiaries, while others were owned and operated by third parties. 
In 2007, TNK-BP sold 1.34 million tons of petroleum products through its own retail 
network (RusEnergy, 2007).
BP was an active player in the Sakhalin Region, progressing exploration and apprais-
al in an IJV with Rosne=. In 1998, BP Exploration and Operating Company (BPEOC) 
formed an alliance with the Russian state oil company Rosne= to explore for oil and 
gas in Sakhalin. !e exclusive bidding agreement was 49% to BP and 51% to Rosne= 
(RusEnergy, 2008).
In 1998 a modern blending plant and laboratory in St. Petersburg (North West Rus-
sia) was opened by the joint-venture company, Baltic Petroleum, which was owned by 
BP (81%) and LUKoil (19%). BP has marketed a quality range of BP lubricant brands 
in Russia, Ukraine and other countries in CIS for more than a decade. !ese brands 
included the premium brands of Castrol and BP. Since early 2000s, following the acqui-
sition of Burmah Castrol, the BP and Castrol lubricant brands have achieved signi"cant 
growth (around 30%) both in Russia and other CIS countries.
BP’s activities on Russian market (Table 4) show the same as with Shell intention 
to control distribution networks and other downstream activities. Oddly enough, even 
TABLE 4. Notable BP deals in Russia
Buyer Target Industry Stake Year
BP Exploration and 
Operating Company
JV with Rosne= Oil/gas exploration 49% 1998
BP Baltic Petroleum ( JV)
Motor oil for sea 
vessels production
81% 1998
BP with TNK Russia Petroleum
Oil/gas extraction 
and re"ning
51% 2002
TNK-BP Severnoyene=egaz Oil/gas extracting 66.16% 2002
TNK-BP and 4 other 
companies
Slavne=
Oil/petroleum 
wholesale
50% 
(combined)
2004
TNK-BP
4 companies holding 
exploration/production 
licenses owned by Slavne=
Exploration/
production
100% 2004
TNK-BP Rospan Gas production
100% 
(increase 
from 44%)
2004
TNK-BP JV with Texaco Motor oil wholesale
100% 
(increase 
from 50%)
2004
TNK-BP AZS-Sibir
Diesel fuel 
wholesales
100% 2005
TNK-BP JV with Sibur Kholding Oil/gas processing 49% 2007
TNK-BP JV with Mezhregiongaz
Gas production and 
distribution
n/a 2008
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free of legislative restraints prohibiting taking full control BP still remained content with 
~50% share in companies in upstream markets. In conjunction with Shell data this leads 
us to a conclusion that in upstream markets when dealing with state-controlled compa-
nies in politics sensitive industries, full control over Russian subsidiary is not needed or 
even not wanted: political and legal expertise combined with local market knowledge 
and technologies appear to be worth much more than full control capabilities.
In downstream markets the situation is exactly the opposite: foreign companies are 
willing to sacri"ce any mentioned above bene"ts for control. !is might be due to the 
fact that downstream markets function in the way markets in developed economies do, 
or at least are much less politically dependent, so a local partner is not needed. !e sec-
ond reason is the price dynamics in oil sector: the price of crude oil has fallen sharply, 
while the prices of oil products have not. !is makes owning distribution networks 
and processing facilities much more pro"table once the access to resources has been 
secured.
4.2. Electricity and power supply sector
Despite dramatic consequences of the world "nancial crisis, construction and infra-
structure are still growing parts of the Russian economy. !is is a good sign for the 
automation and power technology industry, since these are huge customers. !e oil 
industry is another important customer, and this industry is also powerful in Russia 
(Rai$eisen, 2007).
ABB’s biggest competitor on the Russian market is the German company Siemens 
(Datamonitor, 2009). !e local companies in this market are ge?ing a bigger market 
share in the last few years. However, as the power and automation technologies market 
is still growing, there are a lot of chances for all companies operating in it. 
4.2.1. Case study 3. ABB
ABB, a Switzerland based power and automation company, is a merger (in 1988) of 
Brown, Boveri & Cie (BBC) and Asea. A=er the merger, ABB started acquiring other 
companies. In its "rst year, ABB took over 40 other companies. In 1988-1990 ABB 
started a big program to expand in Eastern Europe a=er the fall of the Iron Curtain. In 
the early 1990s ABB focused on expanding in Europe, Asia and the Americas through 
investments, joint ventures and acquisitions. In 1998, ABB took over Elsag Bailey Pro-
cess Automation, which made it the market leader in the automation industry. In the 
early 21st century, ABB started divesting in order to focus more on the core businesses 
(power and automation). For this purpose they sold divisions like nuclear power, rail 
industries, oil, gas and chemicals (Datamonitor, 2009). In its more than twenty years 
of existence, ABB has become one of the largest engineering companies in the world. 
ABB had around 120 000 employees in 100 countries in 2009, and its headquarters 
were located in Zürich, Switzerland. In 2008, ABB had net revenues of 35 billion USD, 
up from 29 billion in 2007. !e net income was $3.1 billion in 2008, down from $3.8 in 
2007 (ABB annual report, 2009).
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!e total sum of ABB’s investments in Russia in 2009 was up to 120 million US dol-
lars (Datamonitor, 2010). !e company invested in partnerships with Russian "rms in 
energy, technology, manufacturing, and innovation (Table 5). ABB paid a lot of a?en-
tion to the brown"eld strategy, with the focus on the partnerships.
!e strategy of high priority for ABB in Russia was creation of IJVs. In all these ven-
tures, ABB had always invested signi"cantly in order to create a completely new level of 
manufacturing facilities, to retrain managers and employees, to reengineer all the inef-
fective business processes, and to form a pro"table enterprise. 
TABLE 5. Notable ABB deals in Russia
Buyer Target Industry Stake Year
ABB Saturn, Moscow Innovative technologies n/a 1992
ABB UETM, Ural
Electro technical equipment 
manufacturing
n/a 1995
ABB Mosenergo, Moscow n/a 2002
ABB
Ensto Busch-Jaeger (Finland) with 
the market and plant in Russia
Power automation  
products
21% - 1; 
79% - 2
2009
ABB established eighteen IJVs in Russia. Reasons for active use of this form of ex-
pansion were:
r TVQQMZ	UIFPQQPSUVOJUZGPS"##UPVTFBMMUIFOFUXPSLTPG3VTTJBOQBSUOFSTBOE
to get an access to the existing supply channels); 
r DPTU	XJUIBMMUIFCFOFėUTPGVTJOHUIFOFUXPSLTPGGPSNFSPXOFST"##DPVME
r EFDSFBTFJODPTUTGPSFTUBCMJTIJOHTVQQMZBOEEJTUSJCVUJPODIBOOFMTEBUBCBTFT
r FYQBOTJPO	FOUSZXJUI*+7TUSBUFHZSFHJPOTEFWFMPQFECZMPDBMėSNT

r XPSLGPSDF	BDDFTTUPBMSFBEZFNQMPZFEXFMMRVBMJėFEBOEDIFBQXPSLGPSDF

!e "rst IJV of ABB in Russia was established in 1992 with the company Saturn, 
which worked as an association of "rms in innovation and manufacturing. ABB used 
this chance to enter the network of these enterprises.
In 1995 ABB entered in an IJV with UETM (a plant, producing electro technical 
equipment in the Ural region). From the initial stage of the existence of this venture 
ABB supplied UETM with new equipment, and all the adaptations were made in order 
to maintain the operations at the e$ective level. !is form was bene"cial for both sides, 
as UETM received ABB’s experience, access to its technologies, equipment, methods 
of managing business, corporate culture, and ABB gained access to the Ural region op-
portunities (customer base, suppliers, resources), established business links of UETM 
and a cheap workforce. 
In 2009, ABB owed shares of Russian enterprises in di$erent spheres (instrumenta-
tion, gas turbines, electrical generators, cables, equipment for oil and chemical industry) 
(ABB own data). Besides, ABB-Chevron consortium participated in the reconstruction 
of the leading oil-re"ning plants in Russia: Kirishine=eorgsintez, Permne=eorgsintez, 
Kuibyshevne=eorgsintez, Nizhnekamskne=ehim, Oil-chemical Company of Angarsk, 
and Moscow Oil-manufacturing Plant (RusEnergy, 2009).
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Although the IJV strategy turned out to be the most popular for ABB in Russia, it 
turned to switching to full ownership or divestment a=erwards. As ABB initially in-
vested money in the development of plants’ infrastructure, the launch of new equip-
ment and a=erwards increased its share in the capital of IJVs and "nally became a full 
owner, this strategy of ABB can be called brown"eld. !e subsidiaries by which ABB is 
represented in Russia (ABB Electroengineering, ABB Azvtomatizatsiya, ABB Energos-
vyaz, ABB Moskabel, ABB Industry and Stroitechnika) are examples of implementing 
a brown"eld strategy via IJV. !e companies from which ABB has divested are ABB-
Turbozam, ABB-Uniturbo, ABB-Stavan, ABB-Gazenergo, ABB-Servis.
ABB was also active in forming strategic alliances with big Russian companies. !e 
most prominent examples are partnerships with Mosenergo and with Gasprom (Raif-
feisen, 2007).
ABB and Mosenergo had "rst projects together in the early 1990s, then during more 
than ten years these companies gained great experience of collaboration, participating 
together in di$erent programs and projects. In 2002, ABB and Mosenergo signed a 
general agreement of cooperation. It undermined cooperative work of both companies 
in modernization of energy equipment, reconstruction of electro stations, heating and 
electrical networks, launch of high-voltage equipment, automation equipment, systems 
of energy distribution, etc. (ABB own data).
Another important strategic partnership with a Russian company took place in 
2000, when ABB created a long-term agreement with Gazprom. !e premises for that 
action were many projects which ABB and Gazprom held together, like a gas-way at the 
bo?om of the Black sea (Rai$eisen, 2007).
!is partnership gave both sides a lot of bene"ts, as one of ABB’s points in the agree-
ment was strategic investment in the Russian economy, and from the Russian side ABB 
could get access to workforce and raw materials. ABB also gained experience of working 
with a very in/uential company, Gazprom, which is one of the biggest companies in the 
world and raised its reputation by having such a partner.
!e pa?erns seen in Shell and BP activities are also recognizable in ABB projects: 
ABB used IJV as a method of entry into Russian market, gaining local market knowl-
edge and preserving business ties of local players. A=er accumulating market knowl-
edge and integrating into energy infrastructure, ABB assumed full control of companies 
it deemed most useful and disposed of the rest while retaining JV based ties with indus-
try giants. !e bias towards wholly owned subsidiaries can be explained by the overall 
bias of ABB activities towards downstream markets.
4.2.2. Case study 4. Siemens
!e closest competitor of ABB in Russia is a German company Siemens. Established 
in 1846, the company has grown into one of the biggest global "rms in energy, power 
supply, transportation, healthcare, and innovation, employing over 450,000 people in 
more than 190 countries including Russia.
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!e turnover of the company was around 90 billion euro in 2008, and around 80% of 
company facilities were located outside Germany (Siemens AG annual report, 2009).
A=er the Second World War, as Siemens faced "erce competition from the USA and 
Japan in the "eld of the technologies, import or FDI entry strategies had become not as 
successful as IJVs for the company. Siemens used the green"eld strategy mainly in order 
to reduce the cost, or to employ cheap labor force.
At the end of the 1990s, the company was focused on optimization of its business 
portfolio through acquisitions, divestments, formation of new enterprises and IJVs on 
the global scale.
In the post Soviet period Siemens mainly used import strategy for Russia (with only 
few green"eld projects) due to the negative perception of the economic situation in 
the country. Since 2000s Siemens tried to do business in Russia like in Europe with the 
establishment of IJVs and of own facilities (RusEnergy, 2008).
Siemens found it bene"cial to explore the strategy of IJV in terms of lower price ser-
vice and valuable help in navigating through local bureaucracy. Russian companies re-
ceived such bene"ts as: starting capital, western management practices, and assistance 
in selling their goods in western markets.   
Being presented in thirty Russian regions, Siemens had o#ces in the most strategi-
cally important Russian cities such as St- Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk, Sa-
mara, Rostov-on-Don and Khabarovsk. 
!e major form of Siemens presence in Russia in 2008 was daughter enterprises 
with Siemens shares. Siemens united more than 1500 employees and about 4000 if con-
sidering daughter enterprises and IJVs. In 2007, sales to customers in Russia amounted 
to more than EUR 946 million. New orders for 2008 totaled EUR 1.2 billion (Siemens 
AG reports, 2008; 2009).
Siemens organizational structure was very /exible and could be transformed fast in 
line with the environmental changes. Since the foundation of the company, Siemens 
built production facilities in Russia, opened joint-stock companies with regional repre-
sentative o#ces, established IJVs, and participated in a lot of contracts in various Rus-
sian industries. 
!e most signi"cant projects of Siemens in Russia were held in collaboration with 
the state owned enterprises or were developed in strategic sectors of the local economy 
(Table 6).
One of the biggest contracts (the sum of 42 million euro) in Russia was signed by 
Siemens’ Power Generation Group with the Russian state-owned oil company Ros-
ne= to deliver three turbines for the power plant in Western Siberia. !is division also 
received an order to set up Russia’s "rst long-term power plant service program at the 
heating and power facility in Kaliningrad. Siemens’ Power Transmission and Distribu-
tion Group when helping to ensure reliable power supplies for Moscow city signed a 
contract with the Federal Grid Company to modernize instrumentation and control 
systems at the Moscow power stations. 
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TABLE 6. Notable Siemens deals in Russia
Buyer Target Industry Stake Year
Siemens AG Elektropult-Siemens
Communications equipment 
production
n/a 2004
Siemens AG
Transconverter  
LLC ( JV)
Railway electrical equipment 
production
n/a 2005
Siemens AG JV with Elcar NPP
Electronic systems 
manufacturer
n/a 2005
Siemens AG Silovye Machiny
Power machinery 
manufacturing
25% 2006
Siemens AG
Tsentr Innovatsionnykh 
Razrabotok ( JV)
R&D 49.9% 2006
Siemens AG
Simens Visokovoltnye 
Apparaty
Electricity distribution 
and control equipment 
manufacturing and wholesale
100% 2009
Siemens AG Rusturbomash ( JV)
Compressors  
manufacturing
Majority 
(undisclosed)
2010
Siemens Industrial Services and Solutions Group actively participated in the Rus-
sian government program of the modernization of the Russian Post O#ce with the 
establishment of advanced automated postal sorting center in Saint Petersburg.
Siemens’ Transportation Systems Group (TS) signed a EUR 300-million contract 
with Russian Railways (RZD) to maintain the eight Velaro RUS high-speed trains or-
dered by RZD in 2006 (RusEnergy, 2007). 
Siemens’ Medical Solutions Group (Med) was playing a key role in the National Health 
Program launched by the Russian government in the mid 2000s (RusEnergy, 2007).
Siemens VAI, a unit of I&S, received a EUR 130-million order from Evraz Holding 
to renovate the oxygen steelmaking plant at Nizhniy Tagil Iron and Steel Works (Rus-
Energy, 2009).
Siemens Home and O#ce Communication Devices (SHC) won an order to supply 
ASDL modems for Comstar Direkt, one of Russia’s leading Internet service providers.
Siemens projects in Russia can be divided into two categories: those connected with 
Russian railways and others. It is clear that even without legal acts prohibiting full own-
ership Siemens leaned to JV options when dealing with state owned large companies as 
did the others. As with other activities we can say that Siemens’ actions are at least not 
controversial to the "ndings in other cases.
4.3. "e local competitive and co-operative context for IJV strategy 
in Russian energy sector
Russian companies in the oil & gas industry control the majority of country’s foreign 
assets. !is industry represents the area of Russian specialization in the world economy. 
However, many other Russian industries have also begun investing abroad. Companies 
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in electricity and power supply are also to be found amongst the top Russian investors 
abroad.
!e Russian oil and gas industry is dominated by companies which are typically 
large, integrated players that bene"t from their scales of operations. !e presence of 
such incumbents intensi"es the rivalry. Due to the fact that oil and gas operations are 
highly energy and labor intensive, "xed costs are also high and market is hard to exit as 
leaving would require signi"cant divestments of assets speci"c to the business.
!e electricity sector was under the process of dramatic changes in the mid 2000s in 
Russia. A number of regional energy companies and large federal power stations, as well 
as the intersystem of electrical grids, were established instead of the centralized state 
monopoly. !e State owns a controlling stake in most companies, regulating all the ac-
tivities of the energy entities and determining the prices of its services and production. 
!e electricity from Russia is historically distributed internationally and can promote 
the development of the industry as well.
Gazprom is the largest Russian company and one of the world’s leading energy com-
panies with around 18% of global gas production. !e main foreign assets of the com-
pany are concentrated in Germany, Ukraine, Poland, Belarus, the Baltic States and some 
other European countries. Gazprom has organized several green"eld projects with its 
European partners, as well as tried to buy companies in highly pro"table distribution 
segments; its state connections have o=en aroused resistance. A signi"cant impulse in 
the company business was an exchange of assets with the German "rm BASF (Gazprom 
received 49% of the famous Wintershall AG). Gazprom also controls an electric power 
station in Lithuania (since 2003) and has built a new power-generating unit in Armenia.
Gazprom uses a wide range of modes when entering a new market. !ough licens-
ing and franchising is not typical in this industry, we can see examples of exporting, 
turn key projects, joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries. Nevertheless the main 
mode when entering European or Asian area is exporting, which has a quite low risk, 
though it is strongly in/uenced by the international agreements between governments. 
Lukoil is the largest Russian private oil company. !e main activities of the company 
are the exploration and production of oil & gas, the production of petroleum products 
and petrochemicals, and the marketing of these outputs. Lukoil has around 1.1% of 
global oil reserves and 2.3% of global production. 
Lukoil began its investment expansion abroad in the middle of the 1990s. Lukoil has 
acquired participating interests in the exploration of oil & gas "elds or oil production 
in countries of CIS, Latin America, Africa, and Arab countries. Since 2008, Lukoil has 
owned two re"neries in Italy. It also has petrochemical plants abroad (in Ukraine and 
Bulgaria, as well as small plants in Belarus and Finland). Nearly 70% of Lukoil’s 6,700 
petroleum stations are located in 24 foreign countries, mainly in the United States.
In spite of recent signi"cant moves abroad, Lukoil’s core market remains Russia and 
to some extent oil-producing CIS countries. !e company enjoys strong leading posi-
tion in its home market with signi"cant though depleting oil and gas reserves. Lukoil’s 
most pro"table activities (production and exploration) are the less internationalized 
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while the less pro"table (marketing, re"nery) are already highly internationalized. !is 
can mean that internationalization is not, in the oil and gas industry, an absolute re-
quirement for high pro"t margins.
Inter $O UES was established as a power distributor of the \O UES (Uni"ed 
Energy System of Russia), a power holding company engaged in the generation, dis-
patching, transmission, and retailing of electricity and heat. A=er the reorganization of 
the company, the original \O UES seized to exist, and several smaller electricity com-
panies were formed. Inter \O UES succeed a considerable part of original company’s 
assets and obtained a notable market share.
Inter \O UES started active purchasing of electric power assets abroad with ex-
pansion in Georgia and Armenia in 2003. In 2004, its subsidiary trading company be-
came one of the major business entities in Finland. At the end of 2000s Inter \O UES 
acquired control over power stations and electricity distributors in a few countries of 
CIS and Turkey. At the end of 2000s Inter \O UES headed a group of more than 20 
companies based in 14 countries. 
In 2009, Inter \O UES joined a $1 bn. investment pool with the Russian state 
owned VTB bank, and Kuwait’s Alghanim & Sons to invest in electricity projects in 
Russia, the CIS and Arab countries. It was also bidding in partnership with Rosatom for 
a contract to build a nuclear power plant in Turkey.
In Table 7 the international results of Russian energy players are presented from the 
standpoint of reasons and motives to establish partnerships with western MNEs.
TABLE 7. Internationalization results of Russian !rms in the energy sector
Foreign 
destinations
Entry modes
Expansion 
approach
Role of the state
Oil and gas Mainly the CIS, 
the Baltic States, 
Europe, and the 
USA. Rarely 
countries of 
Africa, Asia, Latin 
America and some 
Arab countries
Exporting (as 
the main mode), 
turn key projects, 
joint ventures and 
wholly-owned 
subsidiaries. 
Acquisitions in 
trading business
Market-oriented 
and pro"t-
seeking approach. 
Green"eld 
projects with 
European partners. 
Acquisition of 
companies in 
highly pro"table 
distribution 
segments
High state 
involvement,  
varying depending 
on the companies’ 
historical and 
political routes
Power supply 
and electrical 
equipment
Mainly CIS 
countries. Also 
Northern Europe 
and the Baltic 
states. Other 
destinations are 
less a?ractive
Export, 
acquisitions, 
green"eld
Acquisition of 
foreign assets, and 
the consolidation 
of the position in 
the electric power 
markets in foreign 
markets
Very high. 
Government 
support is 
provided in the 
case of large 
contracts and 
projects
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5. Discussion
5.1. Findings of the research
We see our study as having important implications on the IJV literature. In this study, 
we advance the notion that in strategic sectors of the Russian economy motives of 
MNE when entering into IJVs may vary from the motives of international "rms in other 
industries.
Governments o=en impose ownership restrictions on foreign "rms in some indus-
tries in order to protect the dominant position of local companies. !e restrictions re-
lated to the ownership share in an IJV are especially severe in the energy sector. How-
ever, our "ndings indicate that foreign companies, even not constrained by legal restric-
tions, are willing to form IJVs and do not strive for total control.
Our study also has important implications on the strategies of local companies and 
the governments in emerging economies. Obtaining technology and upgrading the 
technological capabilities through collaborations with foreign companies in IJVs are 
the primary objectives of both local companies and the governments in developing 
countries (Beamish, 1993; Meyer, 2004). In establishing IJVs with foreign "rms, local 
companies may prefer to have dominant control so as to prevent MNEs from becoming 
strong competitors in the future. Hence, the restrictions related to the ownership share 
in an IJV are much higher and much more severe in the energy sector.
A higher investment cost of green"eld strategy makes acquisition more a?ractive. 
Hence, IJV can be considered as the easiest mode of the start of acquisition strategy 
since it allows quick access to infrastructure. !is is highly important for the energy sec-
tor which is sometimes strongly protected by local government from the MNEs entry.
From the standpoint of technology di$erences the green"eld strategy can be advan-
tageous only if the signi"cant technological gap between key competitors exists. When 
the technological sophistication of both local and foreign players is about equal (this is 
usually the case of energy sector), the IJV option is more appropriate. 
When participating in IJV in Russian energy sector, MNEs o=en acquire an equity 
stake in an existing local "rm, the stake ranging from minority to equal ownership. At 
the same time, as oil & gas and power supply & electrical equipment are industries 
under the high governmental protection and surveillance, the rise of the share in the 
ownership up to 100 per cent (like it o=en happens in other industries, e.g., construc-
tion and machinery) is impossible. Even an excess of the ownership over some 30-50 
per cent in such IJVs seems to be highly problematic. It is still unclear, whether entrants 
pursue IJV strategy because of their need for market expertise (evidence from down-
stream markets opposes this assumption) and government ties, or mainly because they 
merely seek resource access.
!e market characteristics explain the choice of IJV strategy and its bene"ts of 
which the western companies aspired to take advantage, establishing ventures in Russia 
(Table 8).
 77
TABLE 8. Motives and bene!ts of IJV strategy in Russian energy sector
Sector IJV motives IJV bene"ts
Oil and gas
High upstream market density and 
complication
!e access to the huge national 
projects
High protection by barriers and 
government regulations
Well-established relationships with 
the local authorities; prevention of 
unfair treatment from their side
Few nationally important projects 
accumulating the majority of activities 
within industry
Faster and safer entry
Power supply 
and electrical 
equipment
Low level of the infrastructure 
development (especially in the Central 
and Eastern regions of Russia)
!e access to regional markets of 
Russia
Lower costs of operation (and high costs 
of establishing infrastructure anew)
Diversi"cation into the markets and 
projects of high national priority
!e demand for advanced technologies 
providing MNEs with the chances to 
establish the leadership in Russia
Collaboration with the best performing 
local "rms
5.2. Validity and limitations of the research
In this research, the evaluation of motives and the study of advantages of the IJV based 
mode of entry was by nature a qualitative process. !e main sources of the primary 
data were the managers of MNEs’ subsidiaries in Russia and of Russian "rms in the 
energy related industries. To minimize the e$ects of subjective biases in the interviews 
the most important issues were discussed from several angles. !e data were combined 
from the interviews of the top management and the middle management, and from the 
information of the experts of the selected industries.
!e general validity of the results of this study is limited by the choice of cases. !e 
sampling was theoretical not statistical. !e case companies were represented by their 
reputation of the best companies worldwide and in Russia. !e target sector was en-
ergy, within which two markets were selected: oil and gas, and power supply and elec-
trical equipment.
Two vectors di$erently shape the validity of the research "ndings from the stand-
point of the e$ects of "nancial crisis on the selected industries. First, even huge inter-
national investors withdraw from the announced projects, and the general activity of 
internationalization may fall. Second, taking into account the rise of uncertainty related 
to crisis, the IJV became the kind of panacea in the case of the persevering belief of 
MNE management in necessity to continue oversea expansion.
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6. Conclusions
We conclude with the following issues. First, IJV based strategy allows MNE to over-
come the majority of cultural barriers and learn from its host country partners how to 
operate locally in the emerging economy market. While cultural distance can result in 
MNE’s perception of uncertainty and hassle associated with managing local culturally 
sensitive topics (e.g., human resources), IJV enables these "rms to shi= many of those 
tasks to local partners who are more capable of managing cultural di$erences in suppli-
ers, buyers, and the governments in their respective countries. 
Second, an IJV increases the e#ciency of foreign operations and simpli"es the pre-
paratory period (e.g., the pre-acquisition stage) through the use of existing workforce, 
equipment and supply contracts, and ensures a be?er understanding of the market and 
higher pro"ts due to a lower value and risks of investments.
!ird, when implementing an IJV strategy, risks are coordinated with rewards, al-
though there are a lot of factors which should be analyzed prior to using this approach. 
When an IJV is launched hastily or for purely defensive reasons, MNEs o=en fail to 
evaluate the intentions and capabilities of the local partner. !erefore foreign enterpris-
es that seriously consider entering Russia through IJV should devote enough resources 
and e$ort to prepare and monitor the selection of the partner, management of the ven-
ture and also the communication with the local partners.
Fourth, while IJVs as well as other types of local partnerships are one of the corner-
stones of MNEs investment strategy in Russia, the common threads among IJV based 
strategies studied in the paper are as follows: a) the risk of operations in the country is 
relatively high and must be hedged in that way; b) the pro"ts in downstream markets 
are so high that they imply foreign players operate by themselves; c) upstream markets 
are under strict state control and aren’t governed by market laws, which bends invertors 
to select IJV strategy.
!e important note is that joint ventures and other forms of cooperation promote 
both the success of MNEs in Russia and the internationalization process of Russian 
companies.
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